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ABSTRACT
The province of Ontario has become Canada's largest wind energy market. This was a
result of distinct policies established by the provincial government to encourage
renewable energy developments as part of its power supply system. Using distributive
justice as a lens, this study aims to clarify how wind energy policy design influences
community outcomes for municipalities that host wind turbine projects. Community
benefit agreements between municipalities and wind project developers are a prominent
tool for distributing financial benefits to local populations and these were used
throughout Ontario as part of the wind energy development process. A comparative
analysis is undertaken to examine the characteristics of three distinct Ontario policy
periods against the measured outcomes of community benefit agreements collected
from host municipalities of large wind projects. An increase in use and value of
community benefit agreements is observed across all three policy periods. This
corresponds with expectations of policy characteristics relating to public and municipal
opposition and familiarity of the development process by municipalities. The observed
influence was less consistent for characteristics associated with power contract rates,
local versus central planning authority, and procurement incentives. The results also
quantified the financial contributions of industrial wind turbine projects to local
communities on an individual municipal basis. The findings of this study will help
understand how policies impact community benefits, can inform future wind energy
programs, and creates a reference to increases the transparency of financial
contributions from wind energy projects to Ontario municipalities.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the Ontario government began promoting a policy of renewable energy
development as a viable way forward for provincial electricity generation. By creating
policy environments to support new 'green' energy projects, the province has seen
certain sectors of renewable energy grow from nearly non-existent levels to wide
spread implementation. As a major component of the province's green energy plan,
the construction of large-scale industrial wind projects has garnered particular
attention due to their prevalence and visibility, as well as a number of controversial
implications affecting mainly rural municipalities and residents.
Municipal governments were central to the narrative of wind energy growth in Ontario.
They exercised varying levels of approval authority within the development process
and their direct engagement with developers influenced the successful
implementation of wind energy projects in their communities. This occurred through
mechanisms such as municipal-provincial relations, negotiations with developers,
and project appeals within the environmental approval process.
Municipalities also received pressures from various actors to support or oppose wind
project developments. Anti-wind organizations lobbied local politicians and councils
to stand against wind projects, a position that was juxtaposed by landowners who
stood to receive income from property rentals and developers who promoted
economic benefits through community employment, partnerships, or vibrancy funds.
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Community benefit agreements are a commonly used device when developing large
scale infrastructure projects with negative externalities, such as industrial wind
energy developments. They typically involve financial contributions to the host
community above and beyond any landowner payments or mandated taxes. These
contributions can be viewed as 'goodwill' gestures or compensatory mitigation,
depending on one's perspective toward the subject development. While benefit
agreements are often used as a mechanism by developers to garner local support for
potentially controversial projects, they also present an opportunity for municipalities
to capitalize on available funding and share benefits more widely throughout the
community. However, there is no universally adopted method to apply or administer
community benefit agreements in the context of wind energy projects and distributive
inequities have been observed in some studied regions (Munday, Bristow, & Cowell,
2011).
The large scale implementation and rapidly changing presence of the renewable
energy industry in Ontario from 2003 to 2018 created a variety of political and public
policy challenges that have been examined academically (Fast & Mabee, 2015;
Stokes L. C., 2016; Christidis, Lewis, & Bigelow, 2017; Walker & Baxter, 2017a;
Bues, 2018). Current provincial leadership in Ontario has placed a pause on green
energy program initiatives. This creates a chance to retrospectively analyze the
previous government's policy impacts.
This paper examines how Ontario's distinct policy periods and approaches to
renewable energy implementation influenced the benefits received by municipalities
that became host to industrial wind turbine projects. Community benefit agreements
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were prominently used in the Ontario wind energy development process, however, a
research lacuna exists that limits our understanding of their application in the Ontario
context. The potential for community benefit agreements to act as a new revenue
stream is an important consideration for would-be host municipalities faced with
future wind developments. It is similarly critical for policy makers to know how
provincial investments in green energy were dispersed at the local level via private
wind development projects.
Through the following sections, I will review the origins and timeline of programs
created through Ontario's renewable energy policy environment and outline in more
detail how the acquisition and construction of wind energy projects was handled in
the province. I will then introduce the concept of distributive justice and identify
commonly applied mechanisms used in large-scale wind developments processes to
address relationships with the local community. The focus will then narrow to
defining community benefit agreements, why they are important in Ontario, and how
their use has been promoted and observed in other jurisdictions with wind energy
projects.
Drawing on the academic literature, an overall hypothesis is created with five subhypotheses statements based on characteristics expected to influence community
benefit agreements within Ontario. After outlining the methods undertaken to identify
and collect community benefit agreements with Ontario municipalities, the data is
organized and related back to each of the sub-hypotheses based on observations.
Finally, I will discuss the relevance of these findings with respect to Ontario
municipalities and how they can inform future policy decisions.
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BACKGROUND
Progression of Ontario Green Energy Policy
Between 2003 and 2018, the province of Ontario established several green energy
programs where independent project owners were provided the opportunity to enter
into renewable energy supply contracts with the provincial electrical regulator, the
Ontario Power Authority (OPA) - later the Independent Electricity System Operator
(IESO). Program elements, such as procurement method, price structure, and
incentives were adjusted through the policy environments, resulting in varying levels
of attraction from large and small developers to construct renewable energy projects.
Although various electrical generating sources, such as solar, hydro, biomass, biofuel, landfill gas, and bio-gas, were included in the renewable energy programs, wind
energy played a prominent role in the provincial strategy throughout the policy
timeline. The following section provides a chronology outlining the major policy
instruments used and the interaction between stakeholders, industry, and local and
provincial governments. Following that, a closer look will be taken specifically at
wind energy and the resultant impacts of its increased presence in Ontario.
In 2003, the province of Ontario, under a majority Liberal government, officially
adopted policy direction to encourage electricity generation from renewable sources
by setting targets to increase green energy production by 5% of the total provincial
generating capacity, approximately 1350 megawatts (MW)1, by 2007. Wind, hydro,
and renewable biomass were identified as key areas for expansion within the
electrical generating system. At the same time, the province began to take steps

1

Generally equivalent to powering 350,000 homes (Ontario, 2010).
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toward closing its five coal-fired electrical generation facilities within the same
timeline. These two measures were promoted as moving Ontario toward cleaner,
'greener' energy sources (Ontario, 2019).
Several other global jurisdictions, particularly in Western Europe, had already
initiated similar green energy endeavours and could be looked to for examples of
policy models. These ranged from state owned projects to neo-liberal systems that
attracted private developers through two common methods: feed-in tariffs that
provided preset fixed dollar rates to perspective developers for electrical generation;
and open-market bidding that saw developers establish competitive electrical rates
as part of project proposals. To achieve its goal, Ontario policy makers created the
Renewable Energy Supply (RES) program that used an open-market auction of new
network generating capacity. This system invited private developers to bid on a set
quota of electrical production made available exclusively for renewable energy
projects. Electricity supply contracts were offered under three rounds of auction that
took place between 2004 and 2007, titled RES I (2004), RES II (2005), and RES III
(2007).
Toward the end of the RES program, from 2006 to 2008, an alternate system of
procurement was created for smaller green energy projects. This program only
targeted developments up to 10 MW in size and was called the Renewable Energy
Standard Offer Program (RESOP). The RESOP differed from the RES in that it
utilized a feed-in tariff model, as opposed to a competitive bidding process, that set
fixed electrical rates for private project applicants. Electrical generation rates for
wind power under the RESOP were set significantly higher (11 cents per kilowatt-
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hour) compared to those awarded under the RES (8.0 to 8.6 cents per kilowatt-hour)
(Holburn, Lui, & Morand, 2010). These rates were attractive and made the RESOP
susceptible to large-scale developers breaking up projects into multiple smaller
components in order to meet the 10 MW cap and participate in the program (Holburn,
Lui, & Morand, 2010; Loudermilk, 2017).
By the time the RES and RESOP ended in 2008, Ontario had seen a significant
uptake in renewable energy activity, although it ultimately fell short of its stated goals,
meeting only 60% of the 1350 MW target (Loudermilk, 2017). Public reception of
these projects was mixed, especially in those communities that played host to the
new developments. While some municipalities welcomed the potential for economic
gains to local land owners and promised employment, others "vigorously resisted
local zoning approvals" (Loudermilk, 2017, p. 2) and many of the projects were never
constructed.
In response to local resistance and to further expand Ontario's green energy market,
the province created and passed the Green Energy and Green Economy Act in 2009,
also commonly referred to as the Green Energy Act (GEA). Then Premier and
leader of the provincial Liberal Party, Dalton McGuinty, justified this move by stating:
"We're going to find a way through this new legislation to make it perfectly
clear that NIMBYism will no longer prevail when it comes to putting up wind
turbines, solar panels and bio-fuel plants…We need those jobs. We need
clean electricity, and we need to assume our full responsibility in the face of
climate change (The Canadian Press, 2009)."
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This legislation established a top-down policy environment to streamline renewable
energy project approvals, which would be controlled by the province. This meant
that planning approvals were removed from the local municipal authority and were
now granted through a special provincial Renewable Energy Approval (REA) process.
Coupled with the introduction of the GEA, a second, more ambitious phase of
renewable energy acquisition was developed and promoted as the Feed-in-Tariff
(FIT) program. Just under 5,500 MW of contracted capacity was offered in five
rounds (labeled version FIT 1 through FIT 5) between 2009 and 2016 (IESO, 2020).
At its onset, the program awarded power contract agreements to developers on a
"first-come, first-serve basis" to achieve set capacity implementation targets (Fast, et
al., 2016). After award of the power agreement, successful projects were then
required to satisfy the provincial REA requirements, which included local community
engagement, before proceeding to construction.
The FIT program guaranteed higher set electrical rates to developers than previously
seen under the RES and RESOP; a base rate was set for wind energy contracts at
13.5 cents per kilowatt-hour under FIT 1 and the later FIT 2 to FIT 5 programs had
commitments of between 11.5 and 12.8 cents per kilowatt-hour (Loudermilk, 2017).
These higher set contract rates, along with a new streamline approval process,
attracted significant investment from new green energy developers under the FIT
program.
The FIT program also introduced a unique consideration from its predecessors in
that it sought to encourage local participation by providing pricing bonuses to the

8
base electrical contract rate for projects that had Indigenous or community partners.
The bonuses were weighted based on percent community control of the project,
designed to "encourage local partnerships and to help Aboriginal and community
partners maximize their equity share (Ontario Power Authority, 2010, p. 9)." Wind
developments were able to earn up to a maximum of 1.5 cents per kilowatt-hour for
Indigenous control and 1.0 cent per kilowatt-hour for community control in projects.
During the same time period that FIT was active, the government also directly
negotiated the Green Energy Investment Agreement (GEIA) with developers for an
additional 2,500 MW of wind and solar production. Although these projects
circumvented the FIT application process, and were awarded through ministerial
directive, they received the FIT price structure (Duguid, 2010).
In 2014 the province again adjusted the acquisition process for renewable energy
projects. The FIT program was retained for projects smaller than 500 kW in size and
a new Large Renewable Procurement (LRP) program was established for
developments that exceeded this threshold. The LRP program incorporated notable
changes from the previous FIT processes.
The first change was that the new cost structure designed for the LRP program
moved away from the standard offer, feed-in tariff systems previously employed and
returned to a competitive market-based price system. Prospective developers
responded to a request-for-proposal (RFP), in which they were required to submit
their own electrical contract price for the project. Proposals would then be ranked
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and scored based on several factors, including the value of the power purchase
agreement.
Second, as part of the LRP RFP, "Community Engagement" rating points could be
earned for projects that demonstrated the following: municipal council or First Nation
support resolutions; municipal host agreements that clarify expectations,
responsibilities and costs related to the project; support from landowners abutting
wind turbine properties; and Indigenous participation or partnership in the project
(Ministry of Energy, 2015). Although these points did not provide financial benefits,
as noted in the FIT system, they did factor into the selection criteria to increase the
likelihood of being awarded a contract.
Lastly, project developers were required to initiate consultation through meetings with
both the host municipality(ies) and the public prior to submitting a project proposal.
This was a marked difference from the post-award consultation requirements
identified in the FIT process.
The LRP program was rolled out in two phases across 2015 and 2016. LRP I
resulted in successful proponents for 16 renewable energy projects, totaling 455 MW
(5 wind contracts, 300 MW total). LRP II was initiated, but cancelled when the
Minister of Energy announced its suspension on September 27, 2016 (IESO, 2020).
Following the 2018 provincial election, the newly elected government, formed by the
Ontario Progressive Conservative Party, acted on election promises to end the GEA
that same year. With this repeal, the government was able to stop project approvals
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and planning authority for renewable energy projects was returned to municipalities,
effectively putting a halt to green energy development in Ontario (Ontario, 2018).
Wind Energy Implementation and Reception in Ontario
Although the province's green energy programs supported a number of renewable
technology sources, much of the public focus resided in the area of wind power.
Wind project developments were a highly visible representation of the provincial
policy goals and the source of wide-spread land use planning discussions,
particularly throughout the predominantly rural communities where they were located.
Ontario's wind energy projects consist of construction of anywhere between one to
over one hundred industrial wind turbine towers, in some cases, standing over 150
metres high. Some municipalities were host to multiple projects with hundreds of
turbine sites that were often accompanied by kilometres of transmission towers to
connect the projects to the grid. The following section outlines wind project
implementation within Ontario's renewable policies in greater detail, how they were
received by municipalities and special interest groups, and the province's response.
In 12 years, Ontario went from being a province with nearly zero wind presence to
becoming Canada's largest wind energy market, hosting 96 projects totaling more
than 2,500 constructed wind turbines. This constituted over 5000 MW of potential
electrical generation - 12% of Ontario's installed capacity (CanWEA, 2019; IESO,
2019). The majority of the wind energy generation capacity was contracted through
the three RES auctions, FIT 1 (including the GEIA, which was awarded through
ministerial directive and used the FIT structure and pricing), and LRP I processes. A
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timeline of the primary periods and processes for wind implementation in Ontario are
identified in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Timeline of wind energy implementation in Ontario.

Initially, the provincial direction to increase renewable energy sources received
widespread public support. Polling carried out in 2010 indicated that 89 percent of
Ontarians "supported wind energy in their region" and 86 percent felt that their
"municipal government should encourage and facilitate wind energy development
(Ipsos Reid, 2010; Baxter, Morzarina, & Hirsch, 2013)." Despite these indicators,
grass roots opposition began to emerge in impacted municipalities or areas
'threatened' by wind development. "By the 2011 election, every district with a wind
turbine had at least one anti-wind group (Stokes L. C., 2016, p. 962)."
The introduction of the GEA in 2009 was framed by the Province as a mechanism to
remove the burden of approvals and pressure from anti-wind groups at the local
planning level and centralize the decision making process. In many communities,
this ended up galvanizing local government with wind opponents and, by 2015, 90 of
Ontario's 444 municipalities had made formal declarations of council identifying
themselves as 'unwilling hosts' to industrial wind turbines (Bues, 2018, p. 41).
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At the same time the FIT program created strong financial incentives, attracting
large-scale international developers that came with their own financial backing to
construct projects. There was little uptake on the program's local investment
incentives (Fast, et al., 2016, p. 2) and, due to power contract award conditions that
set strict penalties on projects that were not operational on time, developers were
under pressure to complete the REA requirements and proceed to construction. This
created public concerns about developments being "rubber-stamped" or rushed
through approvals by the province and, while many projects were appealed to the
provincial Environmental Review Tribunal by opposition groups and some
municipalities, very few were rejected (McRobert, Tennent-Riddell, & Walker, 2016).
As a result of growing opposition, and to specifically address municipal pushback of
the FIT process under the GEA, the province once again adjusted its renewable
energy policy instruments, this time with the introduction of the LRP. Provincial
communication to municipalities indicated:
"The LRP program has been designed to provide municipalities with a
stronger voice and additional opportunities to participate in the development of
renewable energy projects. As a competitive procurement program, it is also
designed to encourage cost-efficient renewable energy projects to provide
value for ratepayers (Ministry of Energy, 2015, p. 19)."
The LRP evaluation process clearly encouraged initiating community engagement
early in the development process. This move, however, was not enough to reverse
the anti-wind sentiment that had developed across much of rural Ontario (Stokes L.
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C., 2016). The program incentives did not have the desired outcome, as only 40
percent of the selected wind energy projects under LRP were able to obtain local
municipal or surrounding landowner support (IESO, 2016; McRobert, TennentRiddell, & Walker, 2016).
Ontario also saw other widespread technical issues throughout the green energy
implementation process, such as limited access or capacity of the existing electrical
grid to receive input from new wind projects (Quick, Law, Christidis, & Paller, 2016;
Loudermilk, 2017). In some cases, projects were postponed or had their power
contracts delayed until upgrades could be completed by the provincial transmission
provider. In later instances, projects considered through the LRP program were
prioritized, in part, based on the geographic capacity of the electricity grid (Ministry of
Energy, 2015).
Ultimately, after the 2016 cancellation of the FIT II process by the Liberals, before it
could be completed, and with many wind energy developments still being
constructed in communities as the province was entering a provincial election, the
Progressive Conservatives and New Democratic Party both made strong platform
stances against the GEA as a strategy for renewable energy implementation (Shreve,
2018). Before his party was defeated in the 2018 election, the Ontario Energy
Minister Glenn Thibeault was quoted regarding the green energy procurements,
stating: “How we implemented those policies led to a number of sub-optimal
outcomes (Hill, 2017).” Shortly after taking power, the new Progressive Conservative
government repealed the GEA and cancelled several uncompleted wind projects
across the province.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Distributive Justice and Community Benefits
With the details of Ontario's wind energy policy periods established, we can draw on
other academia and theory to determine how community benefit agreements fit into
the narrative of wind power project developments. Based on John Rawls' social
justice theory, distributive and procedural justice are commonly applied lenses
through which to examine how wind energy projects interact and impact the
communities where they are installed turbines (Cowell, Bristow, & Munday, 2011;
Walker, Wiersma, & Bailey, 2014; Liljenfeldt & Pettersson, 2017; Walker & Baxter,
2017a; Walker & Baxter, 2017b). While procedural justice considers the
engagement efforts and tools that developers use to inform and include local
communities in the siting and decision making processes, distributive justice
concentrates on the dissemination of negative and positive impacts from wind turbine
projects. This study only briefly touch on concepts of citizen engagement, trust, and
legitimacy and focuses on the 'who gets what' distributive facet of wind energy
developments to consider how community benefit agreements between wind energy
projects and municipalities were influenced by Ontario policy decisions.
We see distributive justice contextualized in wind energy project discourse through
the positive and negative aspects attributed to industrial wind turbine construction.
Opponents to these projects frequently draw upon arguments of noise, aesthetic
impacts, and potential health effects on nearby residents or land users. In contrast,
those in favour of wind projects rely on virtues, such as job creation, landowner
income, tax generation, community benefits, and environmental stewardship to
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generate support. Financial compensation is a tool frequently relied upon in the
development process to account for land-use rights, offset negative externalities, or
incentivize local support. The perception of good benefit distribution within the
community can be tied to successful project reception and, in contrast, dissatisfaction
with distribution may develop if seen to be unfair or inadequate, leading to decreased
support (Walker & Baxter, 2017a).
Some mandated financial distribution mechanisms are nearly ubiquitous in western
wind developments, such as increased land use taxes and lease arrangements with
landowners for wind turbines placed on their property. In Ontario, individual property
owners are thought to receive compensation of roughly $8,000 per turbine per year
(Walker, Baxter, & Ouellette, 2014; CanWEA, 2008), however, this information is not
publically accessible or widely shared in the community due to the confidentiality of
the agreements.
Although less consistent in their use, other distributive systems can be found in wind
energy relationships with host communities, commonly referred to as 'community
benefits'. A plurality exists in both the terminology and application of formal and
informal arrangements between host communities and wind energy developments
(Kerr, Johnson, & Weir, 2017; Macdonald, Glass, & Creamer, 2017). Job creation
and infrastructure improvements may result naturally out of the development itself
and are sometimes discussed in this category. However, cooperative ownership,
community investment in the project, community benefit agreements, and vibrancy
funds are prominently noted forms of community benefits (Munday, Bristow, & Cowell,
2011; DECC, 2014; Macdonald, Glass, & Creamer, 2017). These can occur through
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voluntary and/or negotiated interactions between the host community and wind
project developer, or be encouraged through specific policy instruments in the
development process. A further outline of community benefits is provided in Table 1:
Table 1: Types of Community Benefits (adapted from DECC, 2014, p. 8 and Munday, et al, 2011, p. 3)

Community Benefit Type
Community Benefit
Agreements

In-Kind Benefits

Community Partnerships

Socio-Economic Benefits

Material Benefits

Description
 Direct financial contributions from a wind developer
to the community.
 Usually provided via annual monetary payment, but
may be lump sum.
 Also referred to as Community Benefit Fund or
Vibrancy Fund.
 Other provisions with value to the community by the
wind developer.
 May include in-kind works, funding of special
projects, local energy discounts, local
sponsorships, hosting local events, or
natural/environmental enhancements.
 Where the project is partially or fully owned by the
community through investment in the wind project.
 Communities typically receive a return on
investment, but also take on project risk.
 Also referred to as Community Investment, Shared
Ownership, or Cooperative Ownership.
 Job creation, direct employment, skills training, and
educational or environmental awareness
opportunities.
 Derived from actions taken directly related to the
development.
 e.g. infrastructure upgrades required to complete
the project.

Community benefits are traditionally associated with garnering local backing based
on a rational economic model where their provision equates to enhanced support
(Cowell, Bristow, & Munday, 2011; Walker & Baxter, 2017a; Walker, Russel, & Kruz,
2017). This is relevant, as most jurisdictions have an approval process for
renewable energy projects that requires some form of public acceptance; whether for
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broad based policy direction in a centralized system or from a grass-roots resident
base with access to local decision makers. However, the rational relationship
between community benefits and support is not unconditional. Aitken (2010) found
benefit arrangements were considered to be of value amongst community members
and groups, but also saw evidence that the same arrangements were seen as
attempts to "bribe" the community and that this feeling persisted after construction.
This has been noted in the Ontario context where financial benefits to host
communities has led to increased support for wind energy projects but is tempered
by indications that compensation in the absence of procedural justice may have the
opposite effect, resulting in perceptions of bribery or "blood money" (Cowell, Bristow,
& Munday, 2011; Walker & Baxter, 2017a).
Therefore, framing and communication are critical to the success or usefulness of
benefit arrangements in wind developments. Kerr, Johnson & Weir (2017) point out
the UK government's emphasis on terminology such as "community benefit
payments," not "compensation;" the latter carrying the implication that a 'wrong' has
occurred. Although there is evidence to show the negative context of community
"bribes" may be mitigated through institutionalized programs (i.e. regulated by the
state) (Walker, Russel, & Kruz, 2017, p. 74), Cowell, Bristow & Munday (2011) found
in the UK that there was still a strong desire to allow unencumbered negotiation
between the affected community and wind project developers. Mindful of the
outward facing duality of community benefit arrangements, Walker, Baxter &
Ouellette (2014) suggests that "cautious optimism" should be used when considering
their role to garner community support.
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In addition, the fairness of benefit distribution is important. The 'right people getting
the right amount' from wind developments has been associated with public
perceptions of wind developments in host communities. Walker & Baxter (2017a)
found more support for participatory models, such as community ownership, when
compared to simple financial input. While local and cooperative ownership schemes
for wind projects are common in some European jurisdictions, such as Germany,
Denmark, and the Netherlands (Toke, Breukers, & Wolsink, 2008), a polarization
toward financial contributions to communities was observed in UK wind project
implementation (Strachan, Cowell, Ellis, Sherry-Brennan, & Toke, 2015). Ontario's
case mirrored the UK environment with few local governments deciding to partner
with wind energy developments (Fast & Mabee, 2015; Walker & Baxter, 2017a;
Walker & Baxter, 2017b). Indeed, Jami & Walsh (2017) recount the following
statement by the Minister of Energy who tabled the GEA as part of their study:
"When we were crafting the policy we did not properly anticipate the ease with
which developers would attract capital. We rather expected the model, which
we saw and liked so much in Denmark where local projects typically had
hundreds of local investors, was going to be the model. We expected that
developers were going to have to be more community integrated in order to
raise local financial capital. I criticize my own efforts and look at the Green
Energy Act and say, oh this worked and this didn't, that's one of the things that
I think in our construct didn't emerge the way we had expected."
So, while it is recognized that, in addition to private leases with landowners, financial
payments to the community will likely not present an acceptable solution to equitable
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benefit distribution (Walker & Baxter, 2017a, p. 764), it remains the most prominent
community wide benefit tool considered throughout the implementation of Ontario's
green energy programs.
Community Benefit Agreements
Recognizing that there are various applications that can be used to consider
distributive justice, in the Ontario case community benefit agreements offer both a
wide spread and quantifiable variable to demonstrate local benefit sharing. A more
complete definition and review of community benefit agreement application is
presented below to structure subsequent hypothesis formulation and analysis.
Where wind project developers agree to make annual or lump sum financial
contributions to a host community, this is typically formalized through some form of
community benefit agreement that defines the term, amount, any conditions for the
money's use, and the governing body for the funds. In Ontario, where agreements
exist, they are commonly executed between the project owner and the municipal
government. While discussion of the definition of 'community' and appropriate
governance of funds is noted in the UK (Bristow, Cowell, & Munday, 2012), Ontario
based literature presented no examples of benefit agreements being held outside the
local government, who is responsible for allocating the funds.
In Ontario, as in the UK case, offering and negotiating benefit agreements is
voluntary on behalf of the developer. Retaining a perception of 'goodwill' is important
for developers, as it allows them to direct community narratives away from
compensatory language. Approaching benefit agreements through a lens of

20
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) presents an alternative motive to connotations
of payoffs for approvals and wrongdoing (Kerr, Johnson, & Weir, 2017).
Large corporate developers frequently hold the balance of power when negotiating
with rural community bodies who often have limited resources and exposure to these
types of projects (Cowell, Bristow, & Munday, 2011). Jami & Walsh (2017)
suggested that municipalities could "use their leverage in extraordinary ways to
figure out opportunities to the benefit of the local community (p.22)." However, this
"leverage" typically resides in venues of planning approvals and centralized,
technocratic shifts in policy direction can act to remove power from municipalities;
such was the Ontario case with the elimination of local planning authority for wind
projects under the GEA.
Other policy instruments developed in the UK act to create a more equitable 'playing
field' between communities and developers, although stop short of mandated
direction on community benefits. The Community Benefits from Onshore Wind
Developments: Best Practice Guide for England overtly encourages municipalities to
purse agreements with developers as "a rare opportunity for the local community to
access resources, including long-term, reliable and flexible funding to directly
enhance their local economy, society and environment (DECC, 2014, p. 9)." In
addition, the English Register of Community Benefits and Engagement is a voluntary
initiative established to document and publically communicate benefit arrangements
in England and Scotland (Kerr, Johnson, & Weir, 2017). These initiatives provide a
level of transparency and accessibility to both the negotiating parties and community
members that do not currently exist in the Ontario system.
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Provincial leadership in Ontario developed deliberate policy environments to
establish wind power production as part of its renewable energy strategy. This goal
was achieved through the installation of over 2,500 wind turbines across mostly rural
communities with varying levels of acceptance or resistance. Although they were not
mandated as a policy instrument by the province, community benefit agreements
played a significant role in Ontario wind energy implementation (Walker & Baxter,
2017a). Commonly seen as a mechanism to demonstrate goodwill and garner
support for wind turbine projects, which can be advantageous for developers who
want move smoothly through the REA process, benefit agreements also present a
reciprocal opportunity for municipalities to access long-term fiscal resources from
wind projects. The municipal government, then, becomes an agent of benefit
distribution to local residents, so it is important that we understand what factors lead
to benefit agreement outcomes.
Community benefit agreements have been a specific area of focus for both academia
and government policy makers in England, Scotland, and Wales as an integral part
of wind project implementation. Although project case study comparisons comprised
of a limited number of wind projects have been considered in the Ontario context, an
analysis of benefit agreements has not been carried out on a province-wide basis.
Walker & Baxter (2014) suggest that similar transparent practices, such as
community benefit registries in the UK, would better inform provincial and municipal
decision making relating to wind energy developments. This is supported by
indications that public and municipal reaction to the wind projects influenced
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provincial policy development and, where community benefit agreements are
considered to play a role in local acceptance (as they are viewed in the UK), they
have the potential to play a more obvert role in achieving wind energy goals.
Viewing wind energy development through a distributive justice lens, this paper
considers the following research question:
How did Ontario wind energy policy design influence community benefit
agreement outcomes for host municipalities?
In addition to addressing this question, a secondary benefit of this research is that it
documents the benefits formalized between wind developers and municipalities in
Ontario. As far as the literature review has indicated, no other consolidated source
of record for Ontario municipal benefit agreements exists and only one other
research paper was found to publish any actual community benefit agreement values
for the Ontario context (Fast & Mabee, 2015, p. 32).
Given that there are distinct characteristics observed within the stages of Ontario's
policy environment for wind energy projects and that some stages provide more
incentive for developers to enter into negotiated benefit agreements with local
municipalities than others, the following general hypothesis guides this analysis:
H: Ontario policy structures for wind energy projects that encourage and
incentivize local municipal support result in more frequent and higher
benefit agreements for municipalities.
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A summary of the primary Ontario programs for wind energy development, as
outlined in the previous sections, is provided in Table 2. In it, we can identify several
variables that are expected to influence community benefit agreement use. The fixed
power rates provided under the FIT period are greater than the resultant competitive
pricing under the RES and LRP periods. We note that the RES period was the only
era to operate with local planning authority intact, before provincial REA's were
introduced under the GEA. Lastly, while no specific incentives were built into the
RES acquisition process, the FIT period offered additional financial incentives for
wind projects that found community investors and projects that could demonstrate
community support under the LRP system were advantaged in the scoring and
award process for power contracts.
Beyond the noted factors in Table 2, there are two additional variables that are
considered relevant to community benefit agreement outcomes. First, a visible
increase in public and municipal opposition toward wind energy projects was noted
throughout the timeline of their implementation. Second, wind projects in Ontario
were virtually nonexistent prior to initiation of the RES program. This created an
environment of increasing understanding of wind energy projects over time as
municipalities developed expectations when dealing with developers.
The above identified factors can be applied to the overall research question and
hypothesis. To explore this, five direct sub-hypotheses based on these variables are
stated and justified in greater detail below. A summary of the sub-hypotheses and
their expected influence on municipal benefit outcomes is provided in Table 3 at the
end of this section.
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Table 2: Wind Energy Project Power Contract Pricing

Program

Effective
Date

RES

2004 - 2007

Contract
Price
(¢/kWh)
8 - 8.6

FIT

2009 - 2011

13.5* - 16**

Characteristics







LRP

2016

8.6





Pre GEA - Local planning authority.
Competitive pricing.
Unconstrained power contract offer.
GEA applicable - Provincial approval
process.
Fixed pricing.
Financial price incentives for equity
ownership by Indigenous and
community proponents.
GEA applicable - Provincial approval
process.
Competitive pricing.
Proposal scoring incentive for projects
with landowner/leaseholder support,
community support, project community
agreement, and Indigenous
participation.

(Holburn, Lui, & Morand, 2010; Loudermilk, 2017; Ontario Power Authority, 2010; IESO, 2019)
Notes: RES includes RES I, II & III average awarded contract price.
FIT includes FIT 1 and GEIA contracts (*Base price; **Price with incentives).
LRP average awarded contract price.

Financial Input into Ontario's Green Energy Sector
The first element to consider is money. The financial compensation for power
production is likely to have a direct impact on available funds within a
development project to share with host municipalities. Indeed, Toke, et al. (2008)
notes implementation issues in the UK neo-liberal 'market based' systems that
saw developers underbid competitors to the extent of making projects
economically unviable. Where tight profit margins or instability exist, there would
be little room for community contributions, unless mandated. Based on a rational
economic calculation, when the price of energy that can be earned is higher, and
all other variables are considered equal, developers will be more inclined to
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voluntarily engage in benefit agreements with the host municipality to garner
project support.2
Ontario saw distinct financial policy instruments applied to its three primary wind
energy programs. Under the RES period, power contract pricing for wind projects
was determined through competitive auction. The FIT system used fixed
electrical contract offer rates for successful projects and, beyond that, made
additional financial commitments to projects that partnered with municipalities or
First Nation communities. Policy shift under the LRP period saw a return to the
competitive project pricing model, rather than the previously pre-set offers, but
administered contract awards through a RFP process. It should be noted that,
although the LRP program's power contract award criteria gave preference to
projects that had community support, no additional financial incentives were
offered.
H1: More frequent and higher benefit agreements for municipalities will occur
under Ontario policy structures with higher power contract prices for wind
energy projects.
Structure of the Application and Approval Process
A second element to consider is the process of being awarded contracts for
power generation. Implementation of the GEA was the most prominent change to

2

It should be noted that power purchase agreement rates are just one component to wind project
economic viability. Other influential factors are also present, such as variable costs for electrical grid
hook-up, available potential wind energy, and environmental accommodations. While it is recognized
that these additional factors play a financial role in wind energy development, they are beyond the
scope of this study.
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Ontario's process for wind energy projects. By removing planning authority from
the jurisdiction of local governments, the province consolidated power between
itself and wind developers. In the RES system (pre-GEA), developers needed to
gain acceptance of local decision makers or risk extended appeal processes and
uncertain outcomes through an adjudicated tribunal via the Ontario Municipal
Board. The FIT and LRP systems (post-GEA) removed local decision making,
replacing it with streamlined provincial approvals. Based on the conventional
framing of community benefits as a "device for fostering social acceptability"
(Cowell, Bristow, & Munday, 2011, p. 540) there is an expectation of higher and
more frequent use of benefit agreements in the pre-GEA era, where reliance on
local cooperation is more crucial, than in post-GEA regimes. This is additionally
supported by Ontario research that indicates allowing agreement negotiations to
take place in a local planning environment will result in better financial outcomes
for municipalities (Fast & Mabee, 2015).
H2: More frequent and higher benefit agreements for municipalities will occur
under Ontario policy structures where projects require local planning
approvals.
However, post-GEA processes for wind developments were not devoid of local
consideration. The FIT process provided financial incentive for local municipal or
Indigenous ownership and project approvals under the LRP included weighted
proposal scores for projects with documented local support. Although the former
applied only to direct community investment, in the latter process we, again,
expect to see developers employ benefit agreements to secure favour of locals
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for a better chance of provincial approval and potentially to offset higher electrical
rates in the proposals.
H3: More frequent and higher benefit agreements for municipalities will occur
under Ontario policy structures that incentivize local community and
government support.
These two hypotheses compete with each other in the Ontario case where, as the
province removed the local approval authority related to H2 through legislation, it
later tried to reinstate local involvement through the acquisition process related to
H3.
Actor Influence
As noted previously, community benefits are often seen as a way of gathering
support for projects. Therefore, other actors outside the formal arrangements of
wind energy projects could potentially influence the willingness of developer and
municipalities to enter into benefit agreements. Opposition to wind turbine
projects increased throughout the provincial policy timeline, both by the
organization of local public resistance groups and by municipalities, through
formal council statements against wind developments (Stokes L. C., 2016; Bues,
2018). Fast & Mabee (2015) additionally noted a general increase in anti-wind
media coverage through the FIT period. The province was observed to react to
mounting visible opposition from the public and municipalities, first by the
Premiere's statements justifying creation of the GEA to combat 'NIMBY'
sentiments and later by designing the LRP acquisition process to address
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municipal cooperation. A reasonable action by developers is to look to
community benefit agreements as an opportunity to enhance corporate image
and garner local project support when presented with opposition from that sector.
The expectation for Ontario's case, then, is to see an increase in frequency at
each stage of green energy implementation as opposition likewise increased.
H4: More frequent and higher benefit agreements for municipalities will occur
under Ontario policy structures with higher levels of public and municipal
opposition.
Finally, we should consider how the normative behaviour of actors associated
with community benefit agreements changes over time. In Wales, Bristow et al.
(2012) found an increasing expectation of benefit arrangements by both
developers and communities and they were observed to be more frequently used
and the typical value increased over time. One explanation for this trend was that
application of benefit agreements was established as "shadow contracts"
between the actors prior to any formal arrangements being discussed (Kerr,
Johnson, & Weir, 2017). As the practice became more common, a preconceived
expectation developed amongst the parties that some form of benefits will be
provided to the host municipality. In some policy regions, this expectation has
become more formal, such as the Scottish Government's 'Good Practice
Principles' recommendation of £5,000 per MW per year (Macdonald, Glass, &
Creamer, 2017, p. 178). Although no formal policy has been implemented in
Ontario, it is reasonable to consider that growing familiarity with the use and
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application of benefit agreements would increase their likelihood of expectation
and application over time.
H5: More frequent and higher benefit agreements for municipalities will occur
over time as actors become more familiar with the application of benefit
agreements.
Table 3: Projected Municipal Benefit Impacts from Policy Characteristics

Policy
Characteristic
Environment

RES

FIT

LRP

Primary
Factor

Benefit
Influence

Competitive OPA Contract Rate (Auction)

Financial

Local Planning Approvals Required

Structural

No Contract Incentives for Local Support

Structural

Low Opposition

Actor

Low Local Familiarity

Actor

Higher Fixed OPA Contract Rate

Financial

Local Planning Approvals Removed

Structural









OPA Contract Rate Incentives for Local
Partnerships

Financial /
Structural

Increasing Opposition

Actor

Increasing Local Familiarity

Actor

Competitive OPA Contract Rate (Proposal)

Financial

Local Planning Approvals Removed

Structural






OPA Contract Award Incentives for Local
Support

Structural /
Financial



High Opposition

Actor

High Local Familiarity

Actor




*Applies to community partnership rather than community benefit agreements.

N/A*
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METHODOLOGY
Research Design
This project uses a comparative analytical approach to consider characteristics of
community benefit agreements for Ontario wind energy projects developed across a
longitudinal timeline. The timeline is segmented into three distinct policy periods of
green energy implementation: RES, FIT, and LRP. The overall timeline is bounded
by the introduction of specific green energy programming in 2004 and the end of the
provincial direction for green energy projects in 2018.
An analytical assessment of the collected quantitative data was used for comparison,
as opposed to statistical methods. This decision for this approach was taken
because there are numerous socioeconomic and environmental factors that would
need to be considered in order to conduct a robust statistical analysis between
communities (Fast & Mabee, 2015; Liljenfeldt & Pettersson, 2017; Quick, Law,
Christidis, & Paller, 2016; Stokes L. C., 2016; Walker, Baxter, & Ouellette, 2014).
The analytical style used in this report reflects similar methods of review from other
studies on community benefits (Bristow, Cowell, & Munday, 2012; Cowell, Bristow, &
Munday, 2011; Munday, Bristow, & Cowell, 2011; Toke, Breukers, & Wolsink, 2008).
Data
The data for this research were obtained through a number of secondary sources
and an original dataset created from documentation received from selected lowerand single-tier municipalities. The data selection criteria and collection process for
this research are outlined in detail below.
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Wind Energy Project Data

Christidis (2013) identifies the difficulties in collecting and verifying data relating to
wind turbine projects in Ontario and this issue is additionally noted by at least one
other researcher (Stokes L. C., 2016). No unified repository of Ontario wind energy
or renewable energy projects currently exists. Project details and siting information,
including individual wind tower locations, are largely unconsolidated. This data was
sourced from multiple venues, some of which included limited detail or were of
uncertain reliability and required further corroboration through cross-referencing with
more formal sources.
Renewable wind energy project information was initially collected and assembled
from the following resources:
o MOEE Renewable Energy Project Listings
o IESO websites for Feed-in Tariff Program, Energy Procurement
Programs and Contracts, and Wind Power in Ontario mapping
o Ivey Business School Policy Brief (Loudermilk, 2017)
o Individual wind project and municipal websites
The initial dataset identified 75 individual Ontario wind projects ranging from 2.35 to
300 MW. This cohort was refined by limiting the research pool to only those projects
equal to or greater than 40 MW in nameplate capacity3 located in the Ontario Ministry

3

The nameplate capacity represents the total approved electrical generating capacity for the wind
energy project.
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of Environment, Conservation and Parks Southwest, West Central, and Eastern
Regions. The basis for this decision were as follows:
1) A 40 MW wind energy project typically consists of 10 to 20 industrial wind
turbine sites. Projects of this size and greater present a significant community
impact to warrant and influence benefit agreements.
2) Projects in Northern Ontario were excluded due to unique challenges relating
to costs associated with that region, such as access to labour markets and
distance from manufacturers.
3) Although the 40 MW threshold resulted in eliminating projects from the dataset,
the study still considered the majority of identified wind energy projects
constituting approximately 80 percent of Ontario's wind power generating
capacity (CanWEA, 2019; IESO, 2019).
These changes led to a revised database of 41 wind energy projects that included
the project name, number of turbines, name plate capacity of the project in MW, the
project proponent and/or the current project owner's name, the REA status and REA
approval date (where available), the OPA or IESO contract date, and a municipality
identifying the geographic location of the project.
Municipal Host Identification

This study chose to concentrate on municipal benefits of single- and lower-tier
governments in Ontario. These levels of government were responsible for land use
planning approvals of renewable energy projects before that role was centralized at
the provincial level. Therefore, considering single- and lower-tier municipalities
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allows for a comparison of approval environments between pre- and post-GEA
implementation.
However, wind project and provincial records in the above dataset were found to be
inconsistent when identifying the municipal locations of wind turbine developments.
Lower-tier host municipalities were frequently not referenced in the source
documents and single- and upper-tier municipalities were found to be the most
commonly named geographic project location. In addition, it is not uncommon for
wind projects to span across municipal boundaries and no provincial records were
found that quantified the number of turbines or name plate capacity when multiple
municipalities were identified as host.
Because of these ambiguities, additional research was undertaken to identify and
confirm host municipalities and their respective wind energy project details for each
of the projects in the previously noted dataset. Again, due to the lack of a centralized
source, it was necessary to outline the geographic impact of the wind energy projects
using an on-line source, Ontario Wind Turbines mapping (Ontario Wind Turbines,
2015), a no longer functional website that was linked from a wind turbine opposition
group (Ontario Wind Resistance). This data was then verified using publically
available project mapping and geospatially compared using Google Earth Pro and
municipal boundary shapefiles, obtained through the Ontario Data Catalogue (MMAH,
2015). The individual number of turbines, capacity, and, in some cases, omitted
municipalities, were added to the database on a project by project basis.
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Municipal Benefit Agreement Data

To obtain benefit data, agreements between municipalities and identified wind project
developers were requested from the Clerk (or directed office) in individual
municipalities. Where necessary, a formal Freedom of Information request was
placed through process of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of
Privacy Act, 1990 to obtain the requested documentation. In addition, agreement
documentation was supplemented with information gathered from municipal web
pages, council agendas and archives of meeting minutes.
An assessment was undertaken of each agreement or associated municipal account
of negotiations to classify and valuate benefits received from wind energy
proponents. Collected data concentrated on financial flows to the municipality, such
as community vibrancy funds, that were not tied to compensation, damages, or other
identified direct impacts. These secondary receipts were also noted, but kept
separate from the unencumbered benefits. Where multiple factors were contained
within a single agreement, the 'non-benefit' classification and values were parsed into
separate categories, but not included in the analysis.
Both the total annual value of the provided benefit as well as the dollar amounts per
MW of installed power capacity were calculated for the dataset. The latter of these
normalizes the data to better compare different project sizes and involvement across
municipalities and has been used as a basis for policy targets (Macdonald, Glass, &
Creamer, 2017) and in other community benefit agreements studies considering
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large numbers of wind energy projects (Bristow, Cowell, & Munday, 2012; Cowell,
Bristow, & Munday, 2011; Munday, Bristow, & Cowell, 2011).
The term of the agreements were noted, where available and generally correspond
with the associated IESO power purchase agreements with wind projects. Nearly all
were confirmed to be for a period of 20 years. At least one municipal contribution
was received as a lump sum payment. This dollar figure was distributed equally
across the life of the agreement to achieve a per annum value and normalized as
above for comparison purposes.
Many of the municipal agreements specifically outlined the number and capacity of
wind turbines planned for construction within their boundary. This information was
also used to further verify the impacts of the wind energy projects noted through
previous data acquisition methods. Where there was a discrepancy between the two
datasets, the values in the agreements were used, unless significant documentation
existed to suggest that these values were altered in the final project construction.
Limitations and Assumptions
There are several limitations to note in regard to how this study was structured. The
first is a risk of the data being incomplete. The previously indicated unconsolidated
nature of the source data, discrepancies in information between datasets (e.g.
project names, owners, host municipalities, etc.), and limited post construction
documentation (e.g. turbine numbers and locations) creates reliability concerns. In
addition, it is possible that all municipal agreements were not obtained due to
unavailability of municipal records. Wherever possible, data was crosschecked
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against multiple sources and where deviations were found, judgment was used to
determine which was most reliable.
Another limitation may result from restricting the research pool to only those projects
equal to or greater than 40 MW in size, excluding smaller industrial wind turbine
projects. There may be aspects associated with smaller developments that are not
captured in the data presented in this study. Other studies have observed
heterogeneous public reactions to wind developments based on the size and
configuration of projects, resultant in greater community acceptance of smaller,
dispersed projects (Walker, Baxter, & Ouellette, 2014; Bues, 2018). This dichotomy
may impact the use of benefit agreements if opposition within communities is
similarly influenced, but was not considered further in this study.
Although all projects within the RES policy period exceeded the 40 MW threshold,
smaller projects awarded in the FIT and LRP policy periods were precluded from the
study. In addition, all wind projects initiated under the RESOP fell below the size
limit set above.4 This resulted in the RESOP not being considered as one of the
policy periods examined as part of this study.
The last limitation relates to differences in wind potential across the province. Wind
potential is a determinant of profitability wind energy projects. More profitable
developments may be more willing to share revenues through benefit agreements
with municipalities to garner local support. Quantifying wind potential based on

4

It is estimated that 35 projects representing approximately 350 MW in total were constructed as part
of the RESOP (Loudermilk, 2017) (Yatchew & Baziliauskas, 2011).
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geographic location of developments and examining the relationship to project
profitability was beyond the scope of this study and not included in the analysis.
In addition to the above limitations, several assumptions were required when
assembling the final dataset. Four wind projects that received power purchase
agreements from IESO and had either completed or were in the process of
completing REA's were subsequently cancelled following the 2018 Provincial election.
The details of these projects and the application of their data are as follows:
1. Nation Rise Wind Farm
Policy Period:

LRP

Cancelled:

December 2019

Municipality:

Township of North Stormont.

Data Use:

Community benefit agreement was executed prior to
cancellation; data retained in study.

2. Strong Breeze Wind Project
Policy Period:

LRP

Cancelled:

July 2018

Municipality:

Municipality of Dutton Dunwich

Data Use:

Draft community benefit agreement was negotiated but
remained unexecuted following the project cancellation;
data retained in study.
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3. Otter Creek Wind Farm
Policy Period:

LRP

Cancelled:

July 2018

Municipality:

Municipality of Chatham-Kent.

Data Use:

Agreements not obtained; not included in study.

4. White Pine Wind Farm
Policy Period:

FIT

Cancelled:

July 2018

Municipality:

Prince Edward County

Data Use:

Agreements not obtained; not included in study.

Although it is possible that if the draft agreement obtained from the Municipality of
Dutton Dunwich had proceeded, it may have undergone revisions before it was
executed, the state of documentation and values included in the agreement suggest
that it was sufficiently complete to warrant inclusion in this study.
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RESULTS AND FINDINGS
This study identified 27 lower- and single-tier municipalities that are host to 41 wind
projects equal to or greater than 40 MW in size, regardless of total capacity located
in the individual municipality. 24 of those municipalities were either able to provide
some form of municipal agreement(s) or confirm that no agreement was entered into
with the identified wind energy developer. Two municipalities did not respond and
two municipalities were only able to confirm agreements for a portion of projects in
their respective communities. The Municipality of Chatham-Kent was also isolated
from the study data due to the preliminary status of the data sources and the unique
arrangements made with wind developments, as further discussed below. A map of
the municipalities identified as part of this study is presented as Figure 2.
After eliminating municipalities with unconfirmed data and accounting for projects
that were sited across municipal boundaries, this study analyzed a total of 39
relationships between municipalities and wind farm developments. This included
instances where a benefit agreement exists between a municipality and developer
and when no agreement was present. Where agreements were present, they were
reviewed to quantify the value and nature of the agreements. The considered
dataset is presented in Appendix A and a summary of the findings is provided in
Table 4 below.
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Figure 2: Community benefit agreement status of Ontario municipalities with wind energy projects equal
to or larger than 40 MW identified as part of this study. Google Earth Pro V 7.3.2.5776 (March 5, 2019).
Ontario, Canada. 43°52'57.81"N, 79°47'20.13"W, elev 275m, eye alt 982.32 km. SIO, NOAA, U.S. Navy, NGA,
GEBCO [January 29, 2020].
Table 4: Community Benefit Agreement Outcomes in Ontario (adapted from Cowell, et al. (2011); Munday,
et al. (2011); Bristow, et al. (2012))

Benefit Characteristic

RES
2004-2007
(n=8)

FIT
2009-2011
(n=28)

LRP
2016
(n=3)

4

20

3

$1,673

$3,243

$3,389

$99 - $3,261

$192 - $7,000

$3,000 - $4,167

4

8

0

Community benefit agreements
(provision of money by developer)
Number of benefit agreements
Average agreement payment
($/MW/year)
Agreement payment range
($/MW/year)
Projects hosted without municipal
benefit agreements in place

41

In total 27 community benefit agreements were enacted between Ontario
municipalities and wind developments; 12 instances were confirmed where hosted
projects had no benefit agreement in place with municipalities. In general, a rise in
the use and value of benefit agreements is observed across the timeline of this study.
Figure 3 shows that, on a percent basis, benefit agreements were used more
frequently in the latter policy periods, with 50 percent implementation during the RES
period, increasing to 100 percent use for projects initiated as part of the LRP period.

Community Benefit Agreement Implementation Rate
100%

0

90%

8

Implementation Rate

80%
70%

4

60%
50%

3

40%

No Agreement
Agreement

20

30%
20%

4

10%
0%
RES

FIT

LRP

Policy Period
Figure 3: Use of municipal benefit agreements by policy period. RES: n=8; FIT: n=28; LRP: n=3.

The average value of benefits agreements also rose across the three periods (see
Figure 4). There was a notable rise from the RES to FIT periods and a smaller
increase from the FIT to LRP periods. The variation in observed agreement values
can be shown more specifically by calculating the mean and standard deviation (s.d.)
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for each policy period: RES (n=4) mean = $1,673 with s.d. = $1,527; FIT (n=20)
mean = $3,243 with s.d. = $1,350; LRP (n=3) mean = $3,389 with s.d. = $674.
These calculations show that benefit values became more similar as the province
moved from one policy period to the next. However, the distribution of benefit values
shown in the Figure 4 box plot identifies several additional considerations. Four
outliers (two high and two low) were noted in the FIT period, impacting the standard
deviation for the dataset. When those four outliers are accounted for, the range of
benefit values in the FIT period appear more concentrated than the LRP period.
Two of the periods were also observed to contain repeated data values for different
developer-municipal relationships. 12 of the 20 cases in the FIT dataset were valued
at $3,500 and 2 of the 3 cases in the LRP dataset were valued at $3,000. This would
be unexpected if all agreements in each period were negotiated independently, but
not if there was a tendency by municipalities and developers to use a common price
per MW on which to base community benefit agreement values. It should also be
noted that the limited data points for benefit values in the RES (four) and LRP (three)
periods make it difficult to draw strong conclusions based on the datasets.
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Figure 4: Municipal benefit agreement values under each policy period. 'x' denotes mean value for
each policy period, as indicated by 'Average agreement payment' in Table 4. Median
values: RES = $1,674; FIT = $3,500; RES = $3,000. Box limits represent lower quartile (Q1)
and upper quartile (Q3) of each period. Whisker lines represent period maximum (max)
and minimum (min) ranges, excluding outliers. Notes: for FIT period, the median = Q3 =
max = $3,500; for LRP period, median = Q1 = min = $3,000 and Q3 = max = $4,167.

We can now relate this data to the original research question. The observed metrics
of implementation rate and average value of municipal host benefit agreements can
be used to determine where policy characteristics associated with each of the
Ontario wind energy policy periods impacted benefit agreements for municipalities.
Expected outcomes of each of the policy periods based on the previously stated subhypotheses are summarized in Table 5 and discussed further below.
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Table 5: Expected Policy Characteristic Impacts on Benefit Agreements

SubHypotheses

Characteristic

Primary
Factor

RES
to
FIT

FIT
to
LRP

RES
to
LRP

H1

Power Contract Rates

Financial

H2

Local Planning Approvals

Structural

H3

Incentives for Local Support

Structural

H4

Opposition Intensity

Actor

H5

Municipal Familiarity

Actor
















Financial
H1 predicted a positive relationship between electrical generation rates offered to
wind developments and municipal benefit agreement metrics. Figure 5 shows the
municipal benefit agreement values plotted against the date of the provincial
power purchase agreement for the wind energy development, grouped into the
three policy periods. Recalling Table 2, Ontario power contract prices for wind
energy projects were highest under the FIT (13.5 - 16 ¢/kWh) process and lowest
(and relatively equal) within the RES (8 - 8.6 ¢/kWh) and LRP (8.6 ¢/kWh) periods.
An increase of benefit values and use were observed during the transition from
the RES to FIT programs corresponding with the increase in power purchase
rates, as would be expected by H1. However, even though electrical rates
decreased from the FIT to LRP periods, municipal benefit agreement metrics
continued to increase, although marginally.
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Community Benefit Agreement Value by Power Contract
$8,000

Benefit Value
(per installed MW, per year)

$7,000
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Figure 5: Municipal benefit agreement values for each policy period plotted by date that the hosted wind
energy project received its provincial power purchase agreement (n=39). Zero dollar value was used
where no municipal benefit agreements was identified.

Based on the open market, competitive bidding structure that the province used
for the RES and LRP programs, these two periods were expected to be the most
disadvantaged eras to provide financial capacity for community benefit
agreements. Examples of underbidding competitors were noted in other regional
acquisition processes (Toke, Breukers, & Wolsink, 2008, p. 1138). However,
even with similar electrical price incentives, the RES and LRP period differed in
application of community benefit agreements, with the RES demonstrating the
lowest metrics and LRP period the highest, indicating that financial incentives for
wind projects may not be a strong influence on when and how much developers
make available for host communities.
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Structural
H2 indicated that the requirement for local planning approvals would produce
higher municipal benefit metrics than approval systems that are centralized at
upper levels of government. This was based on the expectation that benefit
agreements would be used to garner support from local approval authorities, who
would view the relationship as a positive community financial resource. The RES
was the only program that existed prior to the GEA, when local approvals for wind
energy projects were still intact. If the tendency to have benefit agreements is
tied to local municipal requirements, they should be seen more prevalently in this
initial stage, as opposed to the latter FIT and LRP periods under the GEA's
centralized approval process. However, this was not observed in practice, as the
RES program saw the lowest use and value for benefit agreements. In addition,
while the FIT and LRP were equal, based on their lack of local planning
application requirements, an increase in the benefit agreement metrics was seen
from the FIT to LRP periods.
The LRP application process contained specific incentives that encouraged
developers to obtain local support prior to submitting proposals to the province.
Projects that satisfied this requirement received bonus marks toward successful
award of an electrical generating contract with the IESO. This was not seen in
the RES and FIT policies.5 H3 predicted that policies that include provisions for
community support would result in better benefit opportunities for municipalities.

5

Although the FIT program incentivized project partnerships through increased power contract rates,
local support was not evaluated as part of the procurement process.
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The highest benefit agreement indicators were found in the LRP stage, when
compared to the two earlier programs, meeting expectations of the H3 subhypothesis. However, this does not explain the increase in metrics from the RES
to FIT phases, where we would expect no change in benefit use and value since
the program incentives remained static across these two periods.
Actor
H4 relied on the traditionally-held position that developers will use community
benefits to garner local support in the face of strong opposition. Ontario saw
increasing opposition to wind energy projects throughout the policy periods, both
publically (Stokes L. C., 2016) and municipally through the occurrence of an
increasing number of 'unwilling host' declarations. The posited relationship to the
actors' position was observed through an increase in the benefit agreement
indicators through all three policy periods.
The anticipated outcome under H5 was that municipalities would come to expect
the use of benefit agreements by developers as these relationships became more
common and that this expectation would grow stronger over time. This was
observed in Wales (Munday, Bristow, & Cowell, 2011) and supports the notion of
an established "shadow contract" between municipalities and developers, as
identified by Kerr, et al. (2017). Although variable, benefit agreement metrics
showed a general increased over time from the RES to FIT and from the FIT to
LRP periods, satisfying the concept of H5.
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The relationships of H4 and H5 are tied to the environments and events at the time
that municipal-developer negotiations took place. A plot of benefit value
according to the date of community benefit agreement, as executed by the
municipality, can be found in Figure 6.

Community Benefit Agreement Value by Agreement Date
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$7,000
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Benefit Agreemet Date
Figure 6: Municipal benefit agreement values plotted by benefit agreement date (n=27). Projectsmunicipal relationships without benefit agreements (i.e. zero values) were excluded as no date can be
attributed.

Other Observations
Beyond the overall measure of benefit agreements with respect to policy
environments, we can take away several additional observations from the collected
data.
Annual municipal benefit agreement contribution values are provided in Figure 7
broken out by municipality and by policy era. Individual municipalities are shown to
receive between zero and $1,554,000 annually from wind power projects, as
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identified in this study. Collectively, this accounts for over $7 million per year in
municipal revenues across Ontario. Not surprisingly, projects implemented under the
FIT policy period contribute the largest cumulative dollar value to municipalities, as it
had nearly three times the number of agreements as the other two periods combined.

Municipal Benefits Anually
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$500,000

$1,000,000 $1,500,000 $2,000,000

Haldimand County
Municipality of Bayham
Municipality of Bluewater
Municipality of Dutton Dunwich
Municipality of Kincardine
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Municipality of North Middlesex
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Town of Plympton-Wyoming
Townhship of Malahide
Township of Adelaide-Metcalfe
Township of Amaranth
Township of Ashfield-Colborne-Wawanosh
Township of Frontenac Islands
Township of Huron-Kinloss
Township of Loyalist
Township of Melancthon
Township of North Stormont
Township of Wainfleet
Township of Warwick
Township of West Lincoln
Figure 7: Annual benefit agreement contributions to individual municipalities. Note that projects
associated with the Municipality of Dutton Dunwich and the Township of North Stormont were
subsequently cancelled.

All but three municipalities were found to have some form of additional agreement
with wind developers, either beyond or instead of community benefit agreements.
These generally provided compensation for municipal services, infrastructure use,
and consulting or legal review fees on behalf of the municipality. Several forms of

RES
FIT
LRP
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these agreements were noted: Road Use Agreements for installation of buried utility
lines and impacts related to public road allowances; Transmission and Collection
Line Agreements compensating for the placement of overhead power lines along
public lands; and Restoration Agreements paying for specific or projected repairs to
municipal infrastructure as a result of the wind project. One local government in the
study, the Municipality of Kincardine, also negotiated a lump sum payment of just
over $1 million toward the local airport.6 The value of these agreements were not
included in the Community Benefit Agreement data as the contexts all dealt with
some type of remuneration for damages or required services directly relating to the
project.7
It was not uncommon for wind development projects to span across municipal
boundaries. Nine (9) projects in total were found to impact more than one
municipality. Of these, five (5) developers provided the same benefit contribution to
all host communities and two (2) developers were found to provide inconsistent dollar
values to different municipalities hosting the same project.
Eleven (11) municipalities were host to multiple wind energy projects. Of those, only
two (2) had consistent agreement values with all developers located in their
municipality; seven (7) had varying benefit amounts from different projects or were
inconsistent in their application of agreement use (i.e. had a community benefit
agreement for one project, but not another).

6

The Municipality of Chatham-Kent also received contributions toward to its municipally owned
airport.
7 The donations from wind developers to municipal airports were found to be, at least in part, a form of
compensation to address direct safety impacts on the airport operations from installed or proposed
turbines (Miller, 2014; The London Free Press, 2014; Chatham-Kent, 2017).

51
The Case of Chatham-Kent

Although isolated from this study, the Municipality of Chatham-Kent demonstrated
several interesting qualities relating to wind energy projects that are noted further
below.
Chatham-Kent was found to have hosted wind energy projects from all three
provincial policy periods, with and without community benefit agreements in place. In
addition, although there are other smaller wind energy projects with community
partner agreements in Ontario (Walker & Baxter, 2017a), Chatham-Kent appears to
be the only municipality in this study cohort to have made arrangements to invest in
hosted developments. Lastly, the municipality utilized an additional, observably
unique form of agreement that negotiated for the wind energy developer to utilize the
90 per cent municipally owned power utility as a maintenance service provider for
finished projects.
The types of the investment arrangements made by Chatham-Kent are speculative
and difficult to quantify without additional information. In addition, much of the
information received from the municipality was derived from preliminary negotiations
and documentation and could not be verified in its final form. These conditions made
it difficult or invalid to compare benefits with other Ontario municipalities and benefit
values from the Municipality of Chatham-Kent are not included in the analyzed
dataset.
Recognizing the above limitations, municipal reports to Council regarding ChathamKent wind energy projects did contain information that can be discussed in the
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context of other municipal relationships. Chatham-Kent was host to nine projects
that were equal to or over 40 MW in size from all three policy periods: four RES; four
FIT; and one LRP; although one of the FIT projects was never constructed. The
unconfirmed information available for four (4) of these projects is shown, but qualified,
in Appendix A.
One project from the RES period appeared to have no benefit, maintenance or
partnership agreement associated with its development. Benefit agreement values
of $2,000 and $2,130 per MW per year were identified for two projects in the FIT
period. A $2,500 per MW per year benefit agreement was considered for the LRP
project. These benefit values generally fall within the value ranges observed in other
municipalities (see Table 4 and Figure 4) for the respective periods, with the
exception of the LRP project, which had a slightly lower value.
Negotiations for the above noted FIT and LRP projects in Chatham-Kent included the
provision of maintenance services to the completed projects from the local utility
provider. The maintenance agreement contracts were estimated to range from
$180,000 to $300,000 per year in value of service provided. This type of agreement
was only found within Chatham-Kent. In addition, a commitment of $2.5 million was
received from the FIT project developer toward upgrades of the municipally owned
airport. A similar arrangement to this was seen in one other Ontario municipality.
Lastly, Chatham-Kent was observed to consider investment opportunities in one of
the identified FIT projects and the LRP project. The municipality was able to option
up to 15 percent project equity, arranged through the municipally-owned utility. The
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preliminary values of these partnerships were estimated be in the order of $2 million
for the LRP project and $5 million for the FIT project, equated in additional dividend
payments from the utility to the municipality, and dependent upon actual investment
and other terms and conditions.
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DISCUSSION
The analysis shows that both community benefit agreement use and value increased
as the province moved from both the RES to FIT and the FIT to LRP policy periods.
A comparison of the observed outcome to the expected influence of the
characteristics that formed the basis for our sub-hypotheses statements is presented
in Table 6 and discussed further below.
Table 6: Observed Policy Characteristic Impacts on Benefit Agreements

SubHypotheses

Characteristic

Primary
Factor

Observed Performance

RES
to
FIT

FIT
to
LRP

RES
to
LRP






















Expected Performance
H1

Power Contract Rates

Financial

H2

Local Planning Approvals

Structural

H3

Incentives for Local Support

Structural

H4

Opposition Intensity

Actor

H5

Municipal Familiarity

Actor

For Ontario's policy periods, community benefit agreement outcomes were better in
periods that had more opposition (H4) and where municipalities were more familiar
with wind turbine projects (H5). This supports the common assumption that
developers will use community benefit agreements to build support from local
residents or decision makers, although does not speak to the efficacy of their use in
this manner. It also repeats the findings of the Welsh case where there were
increasing expectations of community benefit agreements by municipalities and
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developers as part of the wind development process as time progressed (Bristow,
Cowell, & Munday, 2012). However, Ontario's situation did not see the same
pressure from upper level government to implement these measures (as in the UK
recommendations, guidelines, and registries) which may indicate that this occurred
organically through community-to-community interaction, such as policy diffusion.
There is indication that the Ontario government's policy decision to offer incentives
that encourage local support within the wind energy procurement process (H3) led to
increased benefit agreement use and value for municipalities. This was observed by
the increase in community benefit metrics from the earlier periods to the FIT era.
This expectation-outcome relationship is again in line with the use of benefit
agreements to gain acceptance locally, however, we cannot tell whether this was
achieved within the individual communities through this study.
Little evidence was found to indicate that electrical power contract rates and local
planning approval requirements influenced community benefit agreement tendencies
(H1). However, we did observe an increase in outcomes from the RES to FIT
periods. Also the increase in agreement use and values from the FIT to LRP periods
was notably smaller than the change between the previous periods. This could
suggest that a price relationship is present, but was overshadowed by other factors
in the later periods and not clearly observable. It could also mean that other financial
factors not considered in this study played a greater role than anticipated in
determining how much project money was available to direct toward municipalities
through community benefit agreements.
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Lastly, with respect to our identified characteristics, we did not observe the expected
outcomes from the presence of local planning approvals (H2) in any of the period
relationships. This refutes the common assumption of benefit use for local support.
However, the provincial policy decision to centralize green energy planning approvals
was a source of pushback from Ontario municipalities, noted through 'unwilling host'
declarations. Although not expected as part of the theory development in this study,
it is possible that the H2 and H4 characteristics created conflicting positions that were
dominated by local opposition in the observations.
As future policy is developed, close attention should be paid to the external policy
environment to ensure that decisions on pricing, incentives, and approval
centralization do not compete with, or are surpassed by, external influences such as
local community opposition and expectations of the development process. Although
community benefits are not an obvert goal of wind development in Ontario,
understanding how they are influenced by policy characteristics can help decision
makers to encourage their use, if desired, or can be lobbied for by municipalities as
new green energy programs are created.
In addition to the explored characteristics, the results of this study support the
position that there is significant potential for municipalities in Ontario to reap financial
benefits from wind energy projects (DECC, 2014; Jami & Walsh, 2017). We see this
through two observations made through the analysis. First, one single-tier
municipality (Haldimand County) secured over $1.5 million annually in revenue due
to the wind energy developments constructed within its boundaries. Second, the
overall benefit agreement values identified in this study account for more than $7
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million per year in funding to Ontario municipalities. Although this does not address
to the actual distributive nature of how municipalities share these values, they are
significant enough in magnitude to support the concept that local governments
should not ignore wind projects as a potential revenue source.
Concerns remain that, although community benefit agreements are used as a tool to
generate local support for wind projects, perceptions of "blood money" make them
ineffective in producing actual local gains in this regard (Cowell, Bristow, & Munday,
2011; Walker & Baxter, 2017a). This deters from the concept of using municipalities
as the distributive agent for benefits. However, from a local government perspective,
the financial supports to municipalities demonstrated above make it difficult to
dismiss this tool as a valid part of the wind development process. Walker & Baxter
(2017b) point out the importance that procedural justice plays in determination of
acceptance in host communities. In addition, there is some indication that requiring
community benefits as part of the policy structure can increase public perceptions of
legitimacy and mitigate negative framing, such as "bribery" (Walker, Russel, & Kruz,
2017). Future wind development processes that incorporate high levels of citizen
participation and mandate community benefit agreements could present a win-winwin opportunity for provincial wind energy goals, successful project implementation,
and fiscal resourcing for municipalities.
Lastly, the Municipality of Chatham-Kent demonstrated that there can be unique
opportunities to partner with wind energy developers that were not widely considered
across other municipalities in Ontario. This example also shows that meaningful
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outcomes that are tailored to the community can be achieved in wind development
processes where developers are open to working with willing municipalities.
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CONCLUSION
Although wind energy is currently placed 'on hold' in Ontario, research in this area
remains important for future programs and where implementation is being considered
in other jurisdictions. How local communities benefit from these projects is an
integral part of understanding policy to support wind energy development. Building
on the findings of this study, there is opportunity to further consider the role that
community benefit agreements play in public perceptions and success of local wind
energy projects. The information presented here can assist in selecting communities
for more detailed analysis, focusing on procedural and distributive justice in Ontario
on a broader scale. Lastly, more work could be carried out to include the impacts of
smaller wind developments and make a more detailed examination of the
approaches taken by the Municiaplity of Chataham-Kent to partner with wind energy
projects.
This work contributes to further the understanding of "the 'how' of benefits
distribution" noted as an important area needing further policy understanding
(Walker, Baxter, & Ouellette, 2014, p. 741). For Ontario, we saw increased use and
value of municipal community benefit agreements across three policy periods. The
research found that although electrical pricing, approval processes, and special
incentives had varying impacts, community benefit agreement outcomes most
closely aligned with the expectations of local/municipal opposition and the overall
familiarity of municipalities with the wind developments as characteristics of the
policy environment.
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These results can inform future wind energy implementation policy on how their
choices influence whether communities get benefit agreements. This is important for
municipalities, as this study shows that wind energy projects can provide a valuable,
long-term, revenue source to support local initiatives.
The assembled data also forms the most comprehensive list of Ontario community
benefit agreements and their values to date, which will hopefully increase
transparency as host municipalities negotiate future wind energy developments
within their communities.
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APPENDIX A

COMMUNITY BENEFIT AGREEMENT DATA
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Ontario Municipal Benefit Agreements with Large Wind Projects (Arranged by Municipality)
Municipality
Haldimand County
Haldimand County
Haldimand County
Haldimand County
Municipality of Bayham
Municipality of Bluewater
Municipality of Bluewater
Municipality of Bluewater
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Dutton Dunwich
Municipality of Kincardine
Municipality of Kincardine
Municipality of Lambton Shores
Municipality of Lambton Shores
Municipality of North Middlesex
Municipality of South Huron
Municipality of South Huron
Norfolk County
Prince Edward County
Town of Grand Valley
Town of Kingsville
Town of Lakeshore
Town of Lakeshore
Town of Lakeshore
Town of Lakeshore
Town of Plympton-Wyoming
Townhship of Malahide
Township of Adelaide-Metcalfe
Township of Adelaide-Metcalfe
Township of Amaranth
Township of Amaranth
Township of Ashfield-Colborne-Wawanosh
Township of Ashfield-Colborne-Wawanosh
Township of Frontenac Islands
Township of Huron-Kinloss
Township of Loyalist
Township of Melancthon
Township of Melancthon
Township of Melancthon
Township of North Stormont
Township of Wainfleet
Township of Warwick
Township of Warwick
Township of West Lincoln
NOTES:
* within municipal boundary
1
(Loudermilk, 2017)

Wind Project
Grand Renewable Energy Park
Niagara Region Wind Farm
Port Dover Nanicoke Wind Farm
Summerhaven Wind Energy Centre
Erie Shores Wind Farm
Bluewater Wind Project
Goshen Wind Energy Centre
Grand Bend Wind Farm
East Lake St. Clair
Erieau
North Kent 1 Wind Project
Otter Creek Wind Farm Project (CANCELLED)
Raleigh Wind Energy Centre (Dillon)
Romney Wind Energy Centre
Port Alma - T1 (KEPA)
Port Alma - T3 (Kruger Chatham)
South Kent Wind Project
Talbot Wind Energy Project (Spence)
Strong Breeze Wind Farm (CANCELLED)
Armow Wind Project
Enbridge Ontario Wind Energy Project (Underwood & Cruickshank)
Cedar Point Wind Farm Project
Jericho Wind Energy Centre
Bornish Wind Energy Centre
Goshen Wind Energy Centre
Grand Bend Wind Farm
Erie Shores Wind Farm
White Pines Wind Farm (CANCELLED)
Grand Valley Wind Farm - Phase 3
Gosfield
Belle River Wind Project
Comber Wind Farm
Pointe Aux Roches
Romney Wind Energy Centre
Cedar Point Wind Farm Project
Erie Shores Wind Farm
Adelaide Wind Energy Centre
Suncor Energy Adelaide Wind Farm
Grand Valley Wind Farm - Phase 3
Melancthon II (Amaranth)
K2 Wind Farm
Kingsbridge 1 Wind
Wolfe Island Wind Farm
Ripley Wind Farm
Amherst Island Wind Farm Project
Dufferin Wind Farm
Melancthon II (Amaranth)
Melancthon I
Nation Rise Wind Farm (CANCELLED)
Niagara Region Wind Farm
Cedar Point Wind Farm Project
Jericho Wind Energy Centre
Niagara Region Wind Farm

Not used in study

No.
Turbines*
67
30
45
56
29
37
13
33
55
55
36
12
52
16
44
44
124
43
20
92
110
27
83
45
50
8
24
29
15
22
40
72
27
1
27
13
37
18
1
18
140
21
86
38
26
49
70
45
29
4
1
12
44

Rated
Capacity*
(MW)
148.6
90
81
124.4
43.5
59.9
21.06
81.9
99.0
99.0
100.0
50.0
78.0
57.6
101.0
99.4
270.0
99.0
57.5
180
181.5
58.7
134.5
73.5
81
19.9
36
59.5
37.5
51
100
166
49
3.6
58.7
19.5
60
40
2.5
27
270
40
197.8
76
74.3
99.1
105
67.5
100
12
2.2
19.2
132

OPA/IESO
Contract
Date1
2-Aug-11
15-Apr-11
4-Jun-10
30-Apr-10
24-Nov-04
30-Sep-11
30-Sep-11
27-Jul-11
5-Aug-11
5-Aug-11
1-Apr-15
1-Apr-16
12-Jan-09
1-Apr-16
21-Nov-05
14-Jan-09
2-Aug-11
14-Jan-09
1-Apr-16
2-Aug-11
21-Nov-04
29-Jul-11
30-Sep-11
30-Sep-11
30-Sep-11
27-Jul-11
24-Nov-04
15-Jun-10
15-Sep-11
13-Jan-09
22-Sep-14
2-May-10
13-May-10
1-Apr-16
29-Jul-11
24-Nov-04
30-Sep-11
29-Jul-11
15-Sep-11
21-Nov-05
2-Aug-11
24-Dec-06
21-Nov-05
21-Nov-05
25-Mar-11
23-Jun-10
21-Nov-05
24-Nov-04
1-Apr-16
15-Apr-11
29-Jul-11
30-Sep-11
15-Apr-11

Benefit Agreement
Provincial
Framework1
GEIA
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
RES I
RES
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
GEIA
FIT
LRP I
LRP
RES II
RES
LRP I
LRP
RES II
RES
RES III
RES
GEIA
FIT
RES III
RES
LRP I
LRP
GEIA
FIT
RES II
RES
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
RES I
RES
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
RES III
RES
GEIA
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
LRP I
LRP
FIT 1
FIT
RES I
RES
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
RES II
RES
GEIA
FIT
RES I
RES
RES II
RES
RES II
RES
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
RES II
RES
RES I
RES
LRP I
LRP
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT

Y
X
X
X
X

N

N/A
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

$ / yr
520,100
315,000
283,500
435,400
149,850
52,650
286,787

$/MW/yr
$
3,500
$
3,500
$
3,500
$
3,500
$
$
2,500
$
2,500
$
3,500

Agreement
Date
26-Sep-11
26-Sep-11
26-Sep-11
26-Sep-11
26-Jun-18
26-Jun-18
23-Jan-17

Other Agreements
Compensation, Transmission
Compensation, Transmission
Compensation, Transmission
Compensation, Transmission
Compensation, Transmission
Compensation, Transmission
Compensation
Compensation, Transmission

$ 200,000

$

2,000

Partnership, Maintenance Contract

$ 144,000

$

2,500

Partnership, Maintenance Contract

$
$ 575,000

$
$

2,130

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

60,000
630,000
470,750
257,250
283,500
69,524
-

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

3,000
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
-

$

Maintenance Contract, Airport
1-Jul-15
21-May-14

31-Mar-15
25-Oct-13
15-Sep-14
1-Jan-15

Compensation, Airport
Compensation
Compensation
Compensation
Compensation
Compensation, Transmission
Compensation
Compensation

X
X

-

$

$ 300,000
$
$ 44,280
$ 15,000
$
$
$ 11,542
$
$
-

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

3,000
904
4,167
192
-

24-May-16

Compensation

$ 702,000

$

2,600

5-Mar-13

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

3,261
99
7,000
2,666
2,667
667
3,000
5,000
3,500

1-Jun-06
20-Mar-12
14-Dec-15
31-Jul-13
24-Aug-07
24-Jul-07
10-Apr-18

Compensation
Compensation, Restoration
Compensation
Compensation
Compensation
Compensation
Compensation

26-Jun-14
16-Mar-16

Compensation
Compensation, Transmission

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

13-Jul-10
6-Nov-18

8-Sep-15

Compensation
Compensation
Compensation
Compensation, Transmission
Compensation, Collection
Compensation
Restoration
Compensation
Compensation

X
X

Compensation, Collection

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

645,000
7,500
520,100
264,201
280,000
45,000
300,000
96,000
462,000
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Ontario Municipal Benefit Agreements with Large Wind Projects (Arranged by Project)
Municipality
Township of Adelaide-Metcalfe
Township of Loyalist
Municipality of Kincardine
Town of Lakeshore
Municipality of Bluewater
Municipality of North Middlesex
Municipality of Lambton Shores
Town of Plympton-Wyoming
Township of Warwick
Town of Lakeshore
Township of Melancthon
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Kincardine
Municipality of Bayham
Norfolk County
Townhship of Malahide
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Town of Kingsville
Municipality of Bluewater
Municipality of South Huron
Municipality of Bluewater
Municipality of South Huron
Haldimand County
Town of Grand Valley
Township of Amaranth
Municipality of Lambton Shores
Township of Warwick
Township of Ashfield-Colborne-Wawanosh
Township of Ashfield-Colborne-Wawanosh
Township of Amaranth
Township of Melancthon
Township of Melancthon
Township of North Stormont
Haldimand County
Township of Wainfleet
Township of West Lincoln
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Town of Lakeshore
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Haldimand County
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Township of Huron-Kinloss
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Town of Lakeshore
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Municipality of Dutton Dunwich
Haldimand County
Township of Adelaide-Metcalfe
Municipality of Chatham-Kent
Prince Edward County
Township of Frontenac Islands
NOTES:
* within municipal boundary
1
(Loudermilk, 2017)

Wind Project
Adelaide Wind Energy Centre
Amherst Island Wind Farm Project
Armow Wind Project
Belle River Wind Project
Bluewater Wind Project
Bornish Wind Energy Centre
Cedar Point Wind Farm Project
Cedar Point Wind Farm Project
Cedar Point Wind Farm Project
Comber Wind Farm
Dufferin Wind Farm
East Lake St. Clair
Enbridge Ontario Wind Energy Project (Underwood & Cruickshank)
Erie Shores Wind Farm
Erie Shores Wind Farm
Erie Shores Wind Farm
Erieau
Gosfield
Goshen Wind Energy Centre
Goshen Wind Energy Centre
Grand Bend Wind Farm
Grand Bend Wind Farm
Grand Renewable Energy Park
Grand Valley Wind Farm - Phase 3
Grand Valley Wind Farm - Phase 3
Jericho Wind Energy Centre
Jericho Wind Energy Centre
K2 Wind Farm
Kingsbridge 1 Wind
Melancthon II (Amaranth)
Melancthon II (Amaranth)
Melancthon I
Nation Rise Wind Farm (CANCELLED)
Niagara Region Wind Farm
Niagara Region Wind Farm
Niagara Region Wind Farm
North Kent 1 Wind Project
Otter Creek Wind Farm Project (CANCELLED)
Pointe Aux Roches
Port Alma - T1 (KEPA)
Port Alma - T3 (Kruger Chatham)
Port Dover Nanicoke Wind Farm
Raleigh Wind Energy Centre (Dillon)
Ripley Wind Farm
Romney Wind Energy Centre
Romney Wind Energy Centre
South Kent Wind Project
Strong Breeze Wind Farm (CANCELLED)
Summerhaven Wind Energy Centre
Suncor Energy Adelaide Wind Farm
Talbot Wind Energy Project (Spence)
White Pines Wind Farm (CANCELLED)
Wolfe Island Wind Farm

Not used in study

No.
Turbines*
37
26
92
40
37
45
27
27
1
72
49
55
110
29
24
13
55
22
13
50
33
8
67
15
1
83
12
140
21
18
70
45
29
30
4
44
36
12
27
44
44
45
52
38
16
1
124
20
56
18
43
29
86

Rated
Capacity*
(MW)
60
74.3
180
100
59.9
73.5
58.7
58.7
2.2
166
99.1
99.0
181.5
43.5
36
19.5
99.0
51
21.06
81
81.9
19.9
148.6
37.5
2.5
134.5
19.2
270
40
27
105
67.5
100
90
12
132
100.0
50.0
49
101.0
99.4
81
78.0
76
57.6
3.6
270.0
57.5
124.4
40
99.0
59.5
197.8

OPA/IESO
Contract
Date1
30-Sep-11
25-Mar-11
2-Aug-11
22-Sep-14
30-Sep-11
30-Sep-11
29-Jul-11
29-Jul-11
29-Jul-11
2-May-10
23-Jun-10
5-Aug-11
21-Nov-04
24-Nov-04
24-Nov-04
24-Nov-04
5-Aug-11
13-Jan-09
30-Sep-11
30-Sep-11
27-Jul-11
27-Jul-11
2-Aug-11
15-Sep-11
15-Sep-11
30-Sep-11
30-Sep-11
2-Aug-11
24-Dec-06
21-Nov-05
21-Nov-05
24-Nov-04
1-Apr-16
15-Apr-11
15-Apr-11
15-Apr-11
1-Apr-15
1-Apr-16
13-May-10
21-Nov-05
14-Jan-09
4-Jun-10
12-Jan-09
21-Nov-05
1-Apr-16
1-Apr-16
2-Aug-11
1-Apr-16
30-Apr-10
29-Jul-11
14-Jan-09
15-Jun-10
21-Nov-05

Benefit Agreement
Provincial
Framework1
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
GEIA
FIT
GEIA
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
RES II
RES
RES I
RES
RES I
RES
RES I
RES
FIT 1
FIT
RES III
RES
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
GEIA
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
GEIA
FIT
RES I
RES
RES II
RES
RES II
RES
RES I
RES
LRP I
LRP
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
GEIA
FIT
LRP I
LRP
FIT 1
FIT
RES II
RES
RES III
RES
FIT 1
FIT
RES II
RES
RES II
RES
LRP I
LRP
LRP I
LRP
GEIA
FIT
LRP I
LRP
FIT 1
FIT
FIT 1
FIT
RES III
RES
FIT 1
FIT
RES II
RES

Y
X
X
X
X
X
X

N

N/A

X
X
X
X
X

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

$ / yr
11,542
520,100
630,000
300,000
149,850
257,250
264,201

$/MW/yr
$
192
$
7,000
$
3,500
$
3,000
$
2,500
$
3,500
$
$
$
$
$
2,666

$
$
$
$

-

$
$
$
$

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

52,650
283,500
286,787
69,524
520,100
470,750
96,000
702,000

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

2,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
3,500
5,000
2,600

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

280,000
45,000
300,000
315,000
462,000
200,000

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

2,667
667
3,000
3,500
3,500
2,000

$

Agreement
Date
8-Sep-15
14-Dec-15
21-May-14
24-May-16
26-Jun-18
25-Oct-13

31-Jul-13

Other Agreements
Restoration
Compensation
Compensation, Airport
Compensation
Compensation, Transmission
Compensation
Compensation
Compensation, Collection
Compensation
Compensation

X
X
X
X
X

-

Compensation
Compensation, Transmission
Compensation
Compensation

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

26-Jun-18
15-Sep-14
23-Jan-17
1-Jan-15
26-Sep-11

31-Mar-15
26-Jun-14
5-Mar-13

Compensation
Compensation, Transmission
Compensation, Transmission
Compensation
Compensation, Transmission
Compensation
Compensation
Compensation
Compensation
Compensation, Collection

24-Aug-07
24-Jul-07
10-Apr-18
26-Sep-11

Compensation
Compensation
Compensation
Compensation, Transmission

16-Mar-16

Compensation, Transmission
Partnership, Maintenance Contract

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

44,280

$

904

$
$ 283,500

$
$

3,500

13-Jul-10

Compensation

26-Sep-11

Compensation, Transmission

$
7,500
$ 144,000
$ 15,000
$ 575,000
$ 60,000
$ 435,400
$
-

$
$
$
$
$
$
$

99
2,500
4,167
2,130
3,000
3,500
-

20-Mar-12

Compensation, Restoration
Partnership, Maintenance Contract
Compensation, Transmission
Maintenance Contract, Airport

$ 645,000

$

3,261

1-Jun-06

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

6-Nov-18
1-Jul-15
26-Sep-11

Compensation, Transmission
Compensation

X
X
X

Compensation

